Incentives in Academia

Strategic and incentive problems are ubiquitous in academia. This not only provides a set of applications such as peer review and peer grading but also provides a testing ground for more general Econ-CS theories. This workshop seeks to bring together both researchers working on academic applications where accounting for strategic reasoning is important (both Econ-CS research and those from other fields such as HCI, EdTech, education, OR, TCS, etc) and Econ-CS researchers whose theories might be tested in academic applications.

The organizing committee is looking forward to your contributions to the 1st workshop on Incentives in Academia, held in conjunction with EC’25 on July 10th at Stanford University. We encourage submissions of research papers or position papers whose methods, models, or key insights are relevant to 1) a scenario in academia and 2) strategic behaviors or incentives.

For example, relevant empirical research may include data-driven or experimental design papers aiming to understand incentives in academic contexts such as peer review, grading, and learner-sourcing. We also encourage theoretical works. For example, insights from information elicitation could enhance the honesty and quality of grading reports, auction theory might optimize peer review processes, and matching market design could improve student admissions, paper bidding, and faculty job market strategies.

In summary, topics of interest include but are not limited to:

• Incentives in peer review
• Mechanisms for grading
• Learner-sourcing
• Mechanisms for teaching evaluations
• Incentivizing innovation
• Market design for admissions
• Data markets for research data
• Incentives in grant funding

• Submission Deadline: TBD
• Author Notification: TBD
• Workshop Date: July 10

Monday, July 10, 2025
Room TBD

• yz1636@dimacs.rutgers.edu